Critical Thinking

This document is designed as a resource for undergraduate students in introductory-level philosophy courses. It provides explanations and techniques for identifying arguments in prose passages, understanding them, and evaluating the quality of their reasoning. Some of the common topics covered include conditional statements, validity and soundness, the counterexample method, and common argument forms.

This essay identifies a neglected kinship between Karl Marx and Ayn Rand: both reject the supernatural, thereby minimizing fundamental human tendencies and constraining individual autonomy in one of humanity’s oldest domains. While their ideological opposition has been extensively documented, scholarship has overlooked how their shared secular absolutism aligns them in limiting freedom. By situating this denial of transcendence and lived experience as a common thread, the essay destabilizes—and ultimately collapses—three major pillars of modern thought: Marxism, Objectivism, and materialist secularism. -/- (...) November 2025. (shrink)

This work is aimed at providing an Islamic perspective on few selected informal logical fallacies. It serves an introduction to the theme of critical thinking and opens ways of reflecting on it, which is the main portion of critical thinking as a subject. Informal logical fallacies are numerous in number and for the sake of convenience they are very often categorized under three classifications: relevance, presumption, and ambiguity. This work discusses few fallacies. The methods applied in this research are descriptive, (...) analytical, conceptual, and critical. In short, in the beginning, the background of the subject and the basic concepts such as argument, fallacy, and critical thinking are briefly mentioned. Subsequently, fallacies are defined, conceptually analyzed, and then appraised according to Islamic perspective. (shrink)

This book serves as an introduction to mathematical logic for STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) students, written for undergraduates (in particular, 1st and 2nd year undergraduates). A focus on this book is on logical thinking, not simply rote memorization, with a focus on examples and analogies relevant to students aimed at becoming technical leaders and problem solvers. This book includes propositional logic, set theory, functions and relations, and more, with coding examples provided in the Python programming language.

The vast majority of grading exams that contain true-false and multiple choice questions encourages students to guess. This leads to two issues: the first is it incentivizes students to be overconfident rather than honestly quantify their level of belief and the second is that instructors cannot see which questions students are certain about versus these where students guess. This paper explores how Probabilistic Grading solves these issues, encouraging students to be honest about their true beliefs and discouraging them from guessing. (...) Probabilistic Grading evaluates both cognition and metacognitive reflection simultaneously, teaching students to become aware of the sources of their uncertainty and encouraging them to be self-directed learners. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept of an absolute—understood as an ultimate, self-sufficient, non-relational foundation of truth, knowledge, or reality—cannot be sustained even in principle. The failure is not empirical and does not depend on human cognitive limits. It is structural: the absolute is asked to be both fully independent of all relations and simultaneously capable of grounding truth, justification, or meaning. These demands are incompatible. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, it states minimal conditions under which the notion (...) of truth retains an epistemic function: recognizability in principle, relationality, and distinguishability from error or fiction. Second, it shows that an absolute, defined as non-relational and criterion-free, cannot satisfy these conditions without ceasing to be absolute. Third, it demonstrates that any attempt to rescue absolute closure generates an infinite hierarchy of meta-levels: each claim of finality produces a further claim that must itself be included and justified. This yields a general theorem: no system can be both absolute and epistemically true. The paper concludes with practical implications for domains that repeatedly reintroduce absolutes in new forms, including artificial intelligence, “theory of everything” projects, and solipsistic epistemologies. Formal details and responses to common objections are provided in appendices. (shrink)

Debates in epistemology and philosophy of science often proceed as if any well-formed claim were, in principle, eligible for empirical confirmation or refutation. Disagreements are then framed in terms of evidence, interpretation, or methodology. This paper argues that such debates presuppose a logically prior condition that is rarely made explicit: not all claims qualify as candidates for epistemic evaluation at all. The central thesis is that a claim can enter empirical inquiry only if it determines conditions under which it could (...) be mistaken. If no such conditions can be specified, empirical investigation is not merely inconclusive but logically inapplicable. This is not an empirical failure, but a structural one. The paper distinguishes between empirical falsification and structural ineligibility, and argues that the latter precedes and constrains the former. Building on a minimal, non-metaphysical analysis, the paper identifies basic logical preconditions that any epistemic claim must satisfy in order to enter evaluation. In particular, a claim must allow for distinguishable alternatives, specify relations to possible evidential conditions, and admit the possibility of error. Claims that fail to meet these conditions are not rejected as false; they are excluded as epistemically ineligible. The analysis is eliminative rather than constructive. It does not propose a theory of cognition, but specifies a necessary condition for epistemic function: only claims that generate differences in possible outcomes can be assessed, tested, or disputed. The reference to Kant in the title is methodological rather than doctrinal. Whereas Kant investigated the conditions of the possibility of experience, the present work examines the logical conditions under which claims can qualify as candidates for cognition in the first place. (shrink)

Carol Dweck's growth mindset framework has transformed educational and organizational approaches to learning and development by emphasizing persistence and effort over fixed ability beliefs. However, systematic analysis reveals a critical structural flaw: the framework creates potentially endless feedback loops with no explicit exit conditions or reflective mechanisms to evaluate when persistence becomes counterproductive. This paper identifies what we term the "Growth Mindset Paradox" - how a framework designed to liberate learners from fixed thinking can itself become a form of cognitive (...) entrapment. Through flowchart analysis and case study examination, we demonstrate that growth mindset implementation often lacks essential components: structured off-ramps for recognizing when approaches are ineffective, reflective reasoning loops for metacognitive evaluation, and criteria for distinguishing productive persistence from pathological continuation. These omissions create a psychological double-bind where individuals experience moral failure for abandoning effort and practical failure for continuing ineffective strategies. Drawing on semantic containment theory and truth evaluation boundary principles, we argue that the growth mindset framework represents a semantically enclosed system that cannot evaluate its own effectiveness without external reference points. The paper proposes four critical enhancements: time-bound reflection triggers, progress-to-effort ratio assessments, well-being indicators, and strategy diversification protocols. Our analysis extends beyond critique to systematic framework improvement, demonstrating how educational and organizational interventions can preserve growth mindset benefits while preventing the psychological harm that emerges when persistence becomes divorced from effectiveness evaluation. The findings have implications for educational psychology, organizational behaviour, and the design of any framework intended to promote adaptive learning and development. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse how coherence should be addressed in critical thinking courses. Our starting point is the fact that, while coherence seems important for rationality and critical thinking, several studies now suggest that thinkers with conspiracy world-views give more importance to coherence than other criteria. However, conspiracy world-views do not (fully) embrace the ideals of rationality and critical thinking. This suggests that some desiderata of rationality or critical thinking can, in isolation, be counterproductive. In response to this puzzle, (...) we first argue that coherence cannot be separated from other desiderata of critical thinking. Becoming more coherent does not necessarily matter if one is unresponsive to the evidence, fails to reason on the basis of justified attitudes, and so forth. Then, we turn to consider the concrete actions that can be implemented in critical thinking courses which would reflect this. Articulating the relationships between the various desiderata of rationality can be difficult in introductory critical thinking courses, since they usually carry different objectives. Still, simple measures can be put in place to give students some guidance. We illustrate our point with marking grids. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze how coherence should be addressed in critical thinking courses. Our starting point is the fact that, while coherence seems important for rationality and critical thinking, several studies now suggest that thinkers with conspiracy worldviews give more importance to coherence than other criteria. However, conspiracy worldviews do not (fully) embrace the ideals of rationality and critical thinking. This suggests that some desiderata of rationality or critical thinking can, in isolation, be counterproductive. In response to this puzzle, (...) we first argue that coherence can’t be separated from other desiderata of critical thinking. Becoming more coherent doesn’t necessarily matter if one is unresponsive to the evidence, fails to reason on the basis of justified attitudes, and so forth. Then, we turn to the concrete actions that can be implemented in critical thinking courses that would reflect this. Articulating the relationships between the various desiderata of rationality can be difficult in introductory critical thinking courses, since they usually carry different objectives. Still, simple measures can be put in place to give students some guidance regarding this. We illustrate our point with marking grids. (shrink)

Digital propaganda is widespread across all social media platforms and in many cases is unintentionally spread. Most people are currently incapable of determining what is factual and what is not on these networks. A number of studies suggest we have entered a period of "truth decay" where facts have been replaced by opinions and subjectivity. Disinformation online is a major contributor to societal polarization and has contributed to a distrust in established organizations like the press, academia, and science. It has (...) been used to great effect by dictators and autocrats who use it to gain supporters and maintain their positions of power. Stopping disinformation will require changes to how social media companies operate, support for legitimate news organizations, and the use of encryption, blockchain and AI technologies. It will also require changes to the educational system which focus on how to evaluate information online. (shrink)

A significant proportion of human reasoning is systematically biased, a fact that sits uneasily with argumentation theory’s methodological commitment to the principle of charity. Traditionally, the principle requires arguments to be reconstructed as plausibly and rationally as possible, which conflicts with the definition of cognitive biases as irrational. The aim of this paper is to show that we can and should integrate cognitive biases into argument reconstruction. Firstly, we demonstrate both the ubiquity and societal consequences of biased reasoning. We then (...) articulate a trilemma for argument analysis: (i) exclude biased reasoning from reconstruction, (ii) redefine it as rational, or (iii) abandon the principle of charity. We argue that this trilemma can be resolved by adopting a nuanced understanding of charity that puts sufficient emphasis on the descriptive standard of accuracy alongside the normative standard of plausibility. By properly pursuing these dual aims, we can account for instances of biased reasoning in argument analysis in terms of the underlying mental states and processes. By taking the effect of the in-group bias in climate skepticism as an instructive example, we present one way of integrating cognitive biases into argument analysis by reconstructing instances of biased reasoning as arguments. The aim of such reconstructions is not to vindicate biased reasoning as epistemically sound, after all, but rather to make its justificatory structure transparent and discussable. (shrink)

Normative argumentation theory is a field dedicated to the normative study of argumentation in real-life contexts and to the development of norms meant to guide arguers in the attempt to argue well. Among argumentation theorists, there exist two widespread assumptions. First, the assumption that ideally, arguers ought to explore the reasons relevant to the topic of their interpersonal arguing without constraints. And second, the assumption that the norms of argumentation should be designed to contribute to the realization of this ideal. (...) In this paper, I question those assumptions. I show that argumentative norms meant to realize the ideal of free exploration, freedom-to-explore norms, reliably clash with morally valuable standing norms that protect privacy, autonomy and legitimate authority. When they so clash, they generate epistemic and other morally relevant harms. I argue that normative argumentation theory ought to resolve this problem by acknowledging the potential legitimacy of standing norms even during argumentation. I show how such a change would impact fallacy theory with respect to the ad hominem and poisoning the well fallacies. (shrink)

This paper investigates the impact of Large Language Model (LLM)-assisted writing on reflective thinking, building on existing adaptations of Albert Borgmann’s device paradigm to Don Ihde’s postphenomenology. Academic writing can facilitate engagement with our beliefs and pre-judgments, making it highly conducive to reflective thinking. However, generative AI tools, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Microsoft Word Copilot, may undermine such meaningful engagement as they ‘disburden’ users of the effort inherent in reflective writing. Still, we fall short when we leave unexamined the (...) kinds of uses each writing app inclines its users to pursue. Despite using the same LLM, a cross-comparison reveals that the user interface (UI) design of ChatGPT and Word Copilot affords distinct forms of interaction: ChatGPT’s UI design may, in principle, facilitate reflective engagement through conversational interactions, prompting users to formulate and engage with their beliefs on a given topic. In contrast, Word Copilot emphasizes automated document production, making a similar kind of engaging use unviable. As a conceptual basis for the argument, this paper extends Ihde’s history of writing ‘technics’ and brings it together with recent conceptual developments in postphenomenology by discussing the apps in terms of ‘quasi-materiality’ of application UIs and the affordances they offer as part of ‘multistabilities’. This paper concludes with a call for academic writers to critically assess how their tools mediate academic writing and thinking processes, arguing that choosing a writing tool for academic writing has ceased to be a matter of personal preference and has become one of academic ethos. (shrink)

Poucos pesquisadores contemporâneos reúnem em seu trabalho a erudição e a sagacidade analítica do legado semiótico do lógico C. S. Peirce com a tarefa fundamental do intelectual crítico. As contribuições que o professor e pesquisador canadense Marc Champagne oferece atualmente ao importante desafio do ensino universitário na era da Inteligência Artificial (IA) são tão valiosas quanto sua crítica à prática acadêmica do cancelamento de pensamentos com os quais não concordamos no universo acadêmico. A extraordinária amplitude de interesses científicos, sociais e (...) culturais de Champagne reflete-se neste intercâmbio que, em razão da considerável distância geográfica que separa os interlocutores, foi realizado de forma virtual. Ainda assim, o vigor e o teor de suas respostas, comentários e contribuições inesperadas enriqueceram de tal modo a entrevista que seus leitores terão a experiência de um diálogo face a face, sem qualquer perda da dinâmica produzida pela interação próxima. O leitor encontrará aqui um encontro incomum e revigorante entre a semiótica peirceana e preocupações centrais do nosso mundo da vida, como a educação, a ética, a verdade e a comunicação midiática. (shrink)

Pocos investigadores contemporáneos reúnen en su trabajo la erudición y sagacidad analítica del legado semiótico del lógico C. S. Peirce con la fundamental tarea del intelectual crítico. Los aportes que el profesor e investigador canadiense Marc Champagne hace en la actualidad al desafío no menor de la enseñanza universitaria en la época de la Inteligencia Artificial (IA) son de tanto valor como su crítica a la práctica académica de la cancelación de aquel pensamiento con el cual no concordamos en el (...) universo académico. La extraordinaria amplitud de intereses científicos, sociales y culturales del Prof. Champagne se ve reflejada en este intercambio que, a causa de la considerable distancia geográfica que separa a los interlocutores, fue hecho de modo virtual. No obstante, el vigor y tenor de sus respuestas, comentarios y aportes inesperado enriquecieron de tal modo la entrevista que sus lectores tendrán la experiencia de un diálogo cara a cara, sin pérdida alguna de la dinámica que produce la cercanía. El lector encontrará una reunión infrecuente y refrescante de la semiótica peirceana con preocupaciones de nuestro mundo de la vida como la educación, la ética, la verdad y la comunicación mediática. (shrink)

Few contemporary researchers combine in their work the erudition and analytical acumen of C. S. Peirce’s semiotic legacy with the fundamental task of the critical intellectual. The contributions that Canadian professor and researcher Marc Champagne is currently making to the significant challenge of university teaching in the age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) are as valuable as his critique of the academic practice of suppressing thought with which we disagree within the academic sphere. Professor Champagne’s extraordinary breadth of scientific, social, and (...) cultural interests is reflected in this exchange, which, due to the considerable geographical distance separating the participants, was conducted virtually. Nevertheless, the vigor and tenor of his responses, comments, and unexpected contributions so enriched the interview that readers will experience a face-to-face dialogue without losing any of the dynamism that comes from close interaction. The reader will find a rare and refreshing convergence of Peircean semiotics with concerns regarding the spheres of our life, such as education, ethics, truth, and media communication. (shrink)

Perspective is a fundamental element in the construction of human meaning. Although the term appears simple, its significance varies depending on the disciplinary field from which it is approached. This article proposes an integrated analysis from philosophical, psychological, mathematical, and psychosocial perspectives, articulated through a structural framework based on the operators of parity, duality, and transformation. The objective is to show how perspective operates as a universal mechanism that organizes individual and collective interpretation of phenomena, and how its development in (...) the social being emerges from dynamic processes of interaction and reflection. (shrink)

The socioecological crisis has been described not only as an environmental crisis but also as a crisis of attention, perception, and human relationships with the living world. While philosophical dialogue has traditionally emphasized conceptual analysis and argumentation, less attention has been given to the perceptual and affective conditions that make philosophical inquiry possible. This article explores the pedagogical potential of a secular adaptation of lectio divina as a preparatory and hermeneutic practice within environmental and philosophical education. Drawing on pragmatist philosophy (...) (John Dewey), environmental ethics (Val Plumwood, Donna Haraway), contemplative pedagogy, and the philosophy of dialogue, it argues that attention constitutes a fundamental epistemic condition for philosophical inquiry and the development of ecological ethical judgment. Through classroom experiences conducted with college and university students, the article examines how slow, attentive reading can cultivate receptivity, emotional awareness, and critical reflection without abandoning philosophical rigor. Particular attention is given to a classroom activity based on Val Plumwood’s Being Prey, illustrating how affective and embodied responses can initiate philosophical inquiry into anthropocentrism, vulnerability, and ecological interdependence. Rather than replacing conceptual analysis, philosophical lectio divina broadens the conditions under which inquiry emerges by integrating perception, emotion, and lived experience into the formation of judgment. The article concludes that contemplative reading practices can enrich philosophical education by fostering forms of attention that support both critical thinking and ecological responsibility. (shrink)

This article critically examines both the historical realities and the constructed myths concerning the Jewish presence in Albania. The author argues that, based on available evidence, it is only from the 4th century C.E. onward that one can speak of a significant Jewish presence and the existence of Jewish communities in Albanian territories. The study scrutinizes the frequent misuse of the term “Jewish community” in historical literature, emphasizing the need for precise definitions grounded in Jewish religious law. It also addresses (...) the phenomenon of “biographical Judaization” of notable Albanian figures, challenging claims unsupported by historical documentation. By advocating for a rigorous and fact- based approach to Albanian Jewish history, the article calls for the abandonment of unfounded myths and urges historians to employ a critical and scholarly perspective. (shrink)

This paper develops the concept of the ecosystem of Papuan extinction: a five-hundred-year civilisational architecture through which cosmobian Papuan societies have been systematically subjected to epistemological violence, structural containment, and manufactured disappearance. Drawing on the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV) framework — developed across its full spectrum from Nature through Civilisation, Civi-lie-sation, and Evi-lie-sation to Psycho-Cosmocide and its counter-movement, Wonesis — the paper introduces the Eight Atlases of Human Existence as a single, interdependent existential ecosystem rather than eight discrete registers, and (...) demonstrates how Indonesian settler colonialism, underwritten by five centuries of European epistemological violence, has penetrated and corrupted each dimension simultaneously. The paper contrasts the Papuan cosmobian ecosystem — generated by relationality and reciprocity — against the Synthobian colonial order generated by extraction, production, and consumption, and grounds this contrast in the Canvas Principle: the argument that land is the irreducible ground upon which every cosmology is painted, prior to any metaphysical claim built upon it. It traces the colonial genealogy from sixteenth-century European naming practices and the racial-symbolic architecture this paper's companion study identifies as Papuaphobia, through the institutional betrayal of the 1969 Act of Free Choice, to the contemporary operating layers of demographic engineering, psychic fragmentation, and manufactured internal competition — read here through the parasitological mechanism of cascading incapacitation and through the four ideological formations of religiosity, development, progress, and success that make participation in one's own disappearance feel like hope. The paper names this condition of self-reproducing destruction the Paradox of Papuan Extinction: a people pursuing what they experience as a better future while that pursuit dismantles the very conditions of their own continuation. Engaging the work of Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, Walter Mignolo, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Paulo Freire, María Lugones, Patrick Wolfe, and Guy Debord, it argues that the extinction of Papuans is not merely political or demographic but ontological: a coordinated destruction of the conditions under which a people can know themselves as a people, imagine themselves as alive, and organise themselves as a force for their own continuation. (shrink)

This paper interrogates the role of Jerusalem as a cosmological fulcrum of the three Abrahamic faiths — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — and traces the global journey of its sacred narratives from their epicentre in the Middle East to the furthest periphery of the colonised world: West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia. Drawing on the author’s own embodied experience as a Papuan Christian convert and later a critical observer, the paper introduces the concept of “psycho-cosmocide” — the spiritual and ontological destruction (...) of a people through the systematic replacement of their indigenous cosmological worldview with an alien sacred geography. The paper argues that the veneration of Jerusalem, when transplanted into colonised communities such as West Papua, operates not as liberation but as a further instrument of dispossession: it redirects spiritual energy, material resources, and political solidarity away from local sacred ecologies toward an externally defined holy centre. Simultaneously, the paper advances a counter-cosmology: the earth itself, and particularly places such as West Papua — whose rainforest represents a living, breathing ecosystem critical to planetary survival — constitute a “New Jerusalem” in the most urgent and material sense. The paper challenges world leaders, religious communities, and scholars to reframe their sacred geographies in ways that honour the sanctity of all life and all places. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay presents, expands, and concretises the central theoretical arguments advanced by Yamin Kogoya in We Are All Inmates: The Cage Just Has Different Names, situating it within the broader Psycho-Cosmocide framework as developed by Kogoya. The essay opens with a critical clarification that the framework does not romanticise pre-colonial or Cosmobian worlds as conditions of paradise. Those original natural worlds contained suffering, conflict, mortality, and unresolved existential difficulty no less than any other human formation on this… planet — (...) borrowing Fanon’s word “wretched”. What they possessed, distinctively, was the capacity to dwell within unresolved existence without constructing totalising systems of false certainty around it. From this clarification, the essay develops the framework’s foundational structural distinction between two existential cages—the primordial cage of irreducible physical and biological being, and the civilisational cage manufactured through symbolic systems, institutional power, and ideological conditioning. It then draws on mythological archetypes from Gilgamesh, Plato, Camus, Ecclesiastes, and Beckett to demonstrate that civilisational consciousness has persistently attempted to deny the first cage while rendering the second invisible. The essay applies these structural analyses concretely to West Papua, examining how Indonesian colonial occupation has deployed the second cage with particular brutality against Papuan consciousness, and how a stratum of colonially-formed Papuan elites has been produced who function as donkeys on Pleasure Island, Pinocchios in the belly of the beast, appointed kings and queens of Neverland, and slow-boiling frogs—psychologically enclosed within the very system that is consuming them. It concludes with the Procrustean principle as the operational mechanism of civilisational forced violence and Wonesis as the framework’s proposed ontological response. The essay draws on comparative mythology, decolonial philosophy, and ontological analysis as mutually reinforcing methodological registers. (shrink)

This paper argues that the deepest determinant of civilisational survival is neither military force nor economic wealth, but trust-based concentrated power rooted in ontological foundations. Drawing from the Psycho-Cosmocide framework and the cosmological vocabulary of the Lani people of West Papua, the paper develops a comprehensive theory of metaphysical power that distinguishes between coercive, symbolic, epistemic, and ontological dimensions of power, while demonstrating how trust integrates these dimensions into the most durable form of collective force across civilisational history. The paper (...) grounds this argument in Lani ontological architecture—AP, Ap-ap, Oʼgur, Muʼnggar, Aʼnggena, and Kugi—and traces the operation of the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV) as a mechanism through which colonial power systematically destroys the internal conditions necessary for trust formation, converting the cosmologically intact Ap into Ap-ap: an ontological counterfeit that unknowingly performs the colonial order. The argument is situated in comparative engagement with the work of Michel Foucault, Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, Walter Mignolo, Ibn Khaldūn, Enrique Dussel, Achille Mbembe, Martin Heidegger, Vine Deloria Jr., and Ubuntu philosophy. It argues that the Lani ontological framework both converges with and exceeds existing decolonial theory by providing a positive ontological architecture grounded in a living Indigenous tradition. The paper concludes that the Papuan experience of ontological dispossession reveals a wider civilisational crisis, and that the reconstruction of trust-based cosmobian life (a term coined within this framework and defined in the Key Conceptual Definitions section below) constitutes both a specifically Papuan liberation project and a contribution to the broader survival of civilisation itself. (shrink)

Critical thinking is supported by a rich and diverse literature, with particularly close ties to argumentation theory and informal logic. It has often been presented in terms of a set of skills and dispositions, with the latter exemplified through the figure of an ideal critical thinker. These accounts of the relevant dispositions are intuitive and tend to emphasize openness, clarity, and a concern for truth. Seemingly running against this impression, it is argued here that an ideal critical thinker can willfully (...) engage in fallacious argumentation. This surprising possibility is grounded in the distinction between thinking and arguing, with the literature on critical thinking being implicitly and rightly limited to the former. The argument draws on an established account of critical thinking dispositions, a simple supporting view of the nature of dispositions, and analogies to familiar phenomena like lying. The result complements existing work on the subject in terms of what a critical thinker should do, contributing to our understanding of the conceptual boundaries of critical thinking and argumentation proper. (shrink)

Este trabajo abordará cuestiones esenciales del imaginario colectivo y sus relaciones con la realidad y la verdad. Primero, debemos abordar este tema en un marco conceptual, seguido del análisis fáctico correspondiente de realidades conductuales demostrables. Adoptaremos no solo la metodología, sino, sobre todo, los principios y proposiciones de la filosofía analítica, que seguramente quedarán patentes a lo largo del estudio y podrán identificarse por las características descritas por Pérez. Rabossi (1975) sostiene que la filosofía analítica puede identificarse por ciertos rasgos (...) comunes. Sugiere los siguientes rasgos familiares: una actitud positiva hacia el conocimiento científico; un enfoque cauteloso de la metafísica; una concepción de la filosofía como tarea conceptual que adopta el análisis conceptual como método; una estrecha relación entre lengua y filosofía; una preocupación por buscar respuestas argumentativas a problemas filosóficos; la búsqueda de claridad conceptual. Estos conceptos originales implican contenidos culturales, sociales, religiosos, científicos, filosóficos, morales y políticos propios de cada existencia colectiva. En este estudio no debatiremos ni demostraremos. Nuestro objetivo no es establecer sistemáticamente un método ni criticar ni aportar pruebas. Este trabajo se basa en la reflexión analítica. Especularemos lo más completamente y profundamente posible y presentaremos los resultados de nuestra especulación. Sin perjuicio del carácter multidisciplinar del tema y de la apertura metodológica para aceptar aportaciones de cualquier campo científico, este trabajo pertenece a la psicología y la ontología o, en otras palabras, a la psicología social y ontológica. La metodología libre que orienta estas reflexiones abarca todo aquello que se acerca a la coherencia con la epistemología filosófica y psicológica. Esta metodología no busca evidencia, sino la interrelación entre la evidencia existente, de cualquier naturaleza y magnitud, para inferir un significado coherente a partir de hechos reales. Muchos grandes pensadores en ningún momento han buscado demostraciones, teorizaciones ni sistematizaciones. Estos pensadores meditaron y pudieron acercarse a la verdad gracias a la iluminación que les brindó su humildad. Ellos serán nuestra referencia y el ejemplo a seguir. De hecho, no encontraremos la verdad. Sin embargo, de una cosa podemos estar seguros: muchas veces nos acercaremos a la verdad y, en todo momento, nos alejaremos de la mentira. El objetivo principal de este estudio es observar cómo funcionan algunos de los atributos evolutivos esenciales de la humanidad. Al igual que la creatividad, la imaginación y la asociación pueden convertirse en una enfermedad peligrosa, al abrigo de las brumosas sombras de la inteligencia. (shrink)

Several decades of work in both philosophy and psychology acutely highlights our limitations as individual inquirers. One way to recognize these limitations is to defer to experts: roughly, to form one’s beliefs on the basis of expert testimony. Yet, as has become salient in the age of Brexit, Trumpist politics, and climate change denial, people are often mistrustful of experts, and unwilling to defer to them. It’s a trope of highbrow public discourse that this unwillingness is a serious pathology. But (...) to what extent is this trope accurate? Answering this requires us to settle both a normative question—under exactly what conditions ought we to defer to experts?—and an empirical question—under what conditions are people willing to defer to experts? The first question has been investigated primarily by philosophers; the second, primarily by psychologists. Yet there is little work integrating these literatures and putting together their results. The aim of this review article is to begin this task, enabling us to begin reaching conclusions about how much real practices of deference diverge from the ideal. We present an opinionated guide to relevant work from both philosophy and psychology, and note places where the literature has important gaps. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to answer the question: „If to think rationally is to think right, then can we learn how to think rationally?“. I attempt to find an answer by providing a commentary on Rosen Lutskanov’s recent book – „A Handbook of Critical Thinking“ (2024). My central claim is that Lutskanov’s exposition clearly shows that thinking right is a matter of skill which can be exercised, educated, and expertized (EEE) and that it is subjected to rigorous logical (...) rules, epistemic norms and pragmatic norms. In my analysis, I will presume that Lutskanov’s understanding of critical thinking allows us to use the conceptual apparatus of social epistemology and to examine critical thinking as closely related to peer disagreement. At the end of my paper, I propose some critical comments on the examined concept of critical thinking that concern the role of perceptual knowledge, the right order of reasons in an argument, and the wisdom of crowds. (shrink)

In Chapter 5 of Transparency and Reflection, Matthew Boyle examines an “anti-Egoist” challenge to my reflective knowledge that I am thinking, which says all I really know is that thinking is occurring. Boyle replies that I know something more, namely that a subject is thinking. Even so, he concedes that traditional Egoists like Descartes go too far in claiming reflective knowledge that an object is thinking. However, these comments argue that there is no stable middle ground between Cartesian Egoism and (...) Anti-Egoism. If I know that I am thinking, then I know that an object is thinking. (shrink)

Many studies find reflective thinking predicts less belief in God or less religiosity — so-called analytic atheism. However, the most widely used tests of reflection confound reflection with ancillary abilities such as numeracy, some studies do not detect analytic atheism in every country, experimentally encouraging reflection makes some non-believers more open to believing in God, and one of the most common sources of online research participants seems to produce lower data quality. So analytic atheism may be less than universal or (...) partially explained by confounding factors. To test this, we developed better measures, controlled for more confounds, and employed more recruitment methods. All four studies detected signs of analytic atheism above and beyond confounds (N > 70,000 people from five of six continental regions). We also discovered analytic apostasy: the better a person performed on reflection tests, the greater their odds of losing their religion since childhood — even when controlling for confounds. Analytic apostasy even seemed to explain analytic atheism: apostates were more reflective than others and analytic atheism was undetected after excluding apostates. Religious conversion was rare and unrelated to reflection, suggesting reflection’s relationships to conversion and deconversion are asymmetric. Detected relationships were usually small, indicating reflective thinking is a reliable albeit marginal predictor of apostasy. (shrink)

The daily increase of authoritarian leaders, totalitarian reforms, and nationalistic sen timent worldwide creates an imperative even for those typically confined to the realm of theory to search for practicable solutions. With his characteristic flare for inconsistency and ostensible pessimism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau strikes even careful readers as a dead-end in this regard. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s writings on civic education and civil religion provide an as-yet untapped resource, offering both a prescient diagnosis of our current predicament and realistic prescriptions as to how (...) we might counteract it. And he is not alone: hitherto all but ignored by scholars, Rousseau’s thoughts on education bear a strik ing resemblance to those of John Dewey regarding experimental inquiry and Paolo Freire’s concerning liberatory pedagogy. For, though hailing from different continents and disparate traditions, all three emphasize that the slide towards tyranny is either en sured or prevented based on a people’s (in)ability to distinguish between nationalism and patriotism. (shrink)

Dieser Sammelband bietet eine interdisziplinäre und kritisch fundierte Auseinandersetzung mit dem Toulmin-Schema als Modell der Argumentationsanalyse und -förderung in Schule und Hochschule. Das Toulmin-Schema ist in vielen Fachdidaktiken etabliert und dient dort als Werkzeug, um Argumentationsstrukturen sichtbar zu machen und argumentative Kompetenzen gezielt zu fördern. Zugleich zeigt sich eine wachsende Kluft zwischen seiner prominenten Rolle in der Unterrichtspraxis und der kritischen Bewertung in der aktuellen argumentationstheoretischen Debatte. Vor diesem Hintergrund versammelt der Band Beiträge aus der Philosophie-, Deutsch- und Geographiedidaktik, die (...) das Toulmin-Schema aus verschiedenen fachlichen Blickwinkeln beleuchten, seine Potenziale und Grenzen analysieren sowie Alternativen aufzeigen. Die Beiträge gehen dabei unterschiedlichen Fragen nach: Welche Argumentationsmodelle sind für den Unterricht geeignet? Inwiefern lässt sich das Toulmin-Schema didaktisch anschlussfähig operationalisieren? Wie wird mit argumentativen Strukturen in unterrichtlichen Kontexten tatsächlich gearbeitet? Neben systematischen Analysen werden konkrete Beispiele aus der Unterrichtspraxis diskutiert, etwa zur Rekonstruktion alltagsweltlicher oder literarästhetischer Argumentationen. Gemeinsam ist den Beiträgen der Anspruch, eine differenzierte, kontextbewusste und theoretisch informierte Perspektive auf das Argumentieren im Fachunterricht zu eröffnen. (shrink)

This paper presents a complete and revised theoretical framework for Psycho-Cosmocide — a term coined to describe the most comprehensive yet structurally invisible form of colonial violence ever perpetrated against Indigenous peoples: the systematic destruction of a people’s entire cosmological framework and their lived relationship with reality. The concept first appeared in Papuan Tragedy: 300 Warnings from the Edge of Extinction, published in June 2025, where it was introduced as a diagnostic framework emerging from the ongoing catastrophe in West Papua. (...) It was subsequently developed and formalised as a standalone theoretical contribution and published on PhilPapers in November 2025. This revised and expanded edition deepens the foundational architecture in response to that reception and to the continuing urgency of the subject matter, and this current revision further extends it with a fully worked ontological architecture of existential captivity, a theory of power, and a substantially developed account of the framework’s antidote. The paper sets out ten key contributions to decolonial and civilisational theory. The twenty foundational reasons establishing the necessity of the concept are organised into five analytical clusters. First, Wone — the primordial Lani cosmological ordering principle — is established as the philosophical basis of the entire framework and situated comparatively alongside the Greek Logos, the Egyptian Maʿat, the Chinese Dao, the Hebrew Dabar, the Polynesian Mana, and the Lakota Wakan Tanka, demonstrating both the universality of the problem the framework addresses and the irreplaceable specificity of its Lani origin. Second, precise definitions are developed for the four terms constituting the framework — Wone, Psyche, Psycho, and Cosmocide — alongside their full etymological genealogy and philosophical positioning. Third, the Seven Existential Cages — the physical, symbolic, metaphysical, and technological cages historically colonisable in specific times and places, together with the Corridor of the Dead, the Cage of Absolute Unknowing, and the Cage of the Irreducible Other, three trans-historical constants the CPCV exploits but did not create — are established as the ontological architecture within which the entire framework operates. Fourth, the Cosmobian and Synthobian modes of being are distinguished not by degree but by generative logic — relationality and reciprocal equilibrium against separation, extraction, production, and consumption — with the Synthobian order shown to possess no independent generative capacity of its own, remaining structurally dependent on the Cosmobian world it converts and consumes. Fifth, the Lani ontological vocabulary — Ap, Ap-ap, Oʼgur, Muʼnggar, Aʼnggena, and Kugi — is presented as a comprehensive philosophical system providing the most granular Indigenous perspective on the destruction caused by Psycho-Cosmocide at the levels of the self, ancestry, shadow, ordering spirit, and community. Sixth, the complete mechanism of the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV) is set out, including six forms of power the virus captures, its life cycle from exposure to civilisational permanence, its carriers, symptoms, immunity, and historical mutations. Seventh, the Eight Atlases of Human Reality are presented as simultaneous sites of cosmological disruption, together with the ecosystem logic specifying what each atlas requires for human flourishing. Eighth, the Dynamic Atlas Model of civilisation survival and collapse is presented together with the Noah’s Ark function — the minimum survival package required to preserve a cosmological world from destruction. Ninth, the three available paths for individuals living within the CPCV are mapped: compliance, resistance, and Wonesis. Tenth, Wonesis itself is developed into a full architecture of three dimensions — physical and biological, cultural and mythological, and metaphysical and transcendental — grounded in a comparative historical pattern of the communities that have preserved continuity through civilisational collapse, an operational grammar of six functions (detection, distinction, reorientation, preservation, transmission, and return), and a closing instruction, stripped of doctrine, that names land itself as the framework’s Noah’s Ark. Taken together, these contributions represent something more than a revision: a maturation. The framework has evolved from identifying the wound to mapping its entire ontological architecture — the given and the constructed, the historically colonisable and the trans-historically constant — its mechanics of power, its historical depth, and its contemporary digital frontier, including the terminal phase of digital cosmological mining. The paper includes a substantive engagement with civilisational collapse theory, a full treatment of the twenty foundational reasons for why the term was coined, the complete mythological and analogical arsenal through which the framework is communicated, the final thesis on the four possible futures for the human species, and the eight pillars of Wonesis as the only available orientation that the evidence honestly permits. (shrink)

The concept of ‘centre and periphery’ has become ubiquitous in the study of higher education, especially in an international context. Through an engagement with the recent scholarly literature, we argue that simultaneously this concept has been decontextualised and naturalised. Its origins were largely forgotten and centre and periphery started to be descriptive of ‘the way the world is’. This article argues for the de-naturalisation of this concept, through an exploration of its genealogy, and a critical analysis of the role concepts (...) play in any theoretically grounded engagement with reality. To achieve that, we develop a heuristic of the critical cycle and we show alternative and powerful ways to engage with the concept ‘centre and periphery’. We argue that critique of the concept should lead to alternative projects for higher education. (shrink)

Following Trump’s time soon to come, critical thinking (CT) has become more important than ever. However, CT faces a challenge: excessive debates about it have obfuscated its meaning. This study adopts an eclectic application of Greco-Roman philosophies by first using Aristotle’s fourfold causality to clarify CT’s current schools and debates, allowing us to move beyond evaluating the pros and cons of each CT approach. The main challenge of CT involves its domestication and absorption within the structured education system and social (...) governance, which trivialize the distance that a critical learner should keep from others and themselves. As a solution to the challenges associated with CT, this study suggests repositioning CT as a Greco-Roman spiritual exercise, offering a way for individuals to mediate the expected distance for criticality. Such antique CT is not teachable, but teachers should lead students to practice such spiritual exercises to interrupt the discourses of dark times. (shrink)

Les conceptions que les étudiants en sciences ont de la nature des modèles scientifiques conduisent à une image inexacte de ceux-ci, notamment lorsque les modèles sont vus comme de simples copies de la réalité. Outre le fait qu’elle en-tretient une conception fausse de la nature de la science, cette façon de se figurer les modèles peut constituer un obstacle pédagogique à l’apprentissage. Objec-tifs : Nous évaluons l’épistémologie de Mario Bunge afin de déterminer si elle peut contribuer à résoudre les problèmes (...) liés à la nature des modèles dans un contexte d’enseignement des sciences. Approche : Après avoir identifié les principales ca-tégories des modèles chez Bunge, nous les employons pour examiner divers as-pects du développement historique des modèles atomiques, puis nous appli-quons le cadre théorique ainsi obtenu aux problèmes liés aux diverses concep-tions des modèles en enseignement des sciences. Participants : En raison de la nature théorique de cette recherche, cette étude ne fait pas appel à des partici-pants autres que les chercheurs des recherches mentionnées. Collecte et analyse des données : Nous avons effectué une analyse comparative constante afin d’identifier les schémas de signification communs au cas historique et au cadre théorique. Résultats : Les caractéristiques attribuées aux modèles par Bunge ont été identifiées dans le cas des modèles atomiques. Ces caractéristiques forment un point de vue cohérent et permettent d’aborder, dans le contexte de l’enseignement des sciences, plusieurs questions liées aux diverses conceptions des modèles. (shrink)

In questo articolo, seguendo la critica di Rahel Jaeggi alle forme di vita, sostengo che per identificare un autentico pensiero critico dovremmo partire da un'analisi della natura normativa delle forme di vita come costituenti di base del mondo sociale. In questa visione, il pensiero critico può essere visto come un comportamento critico. Mentre le genuine forme di vita possono riconoscere e considerare la varietà di situazioni concrete e diverse, al contrario la razionalità critica delle forme di vita non funzionanti comprende (...) la norma come applicata dall'esterno. In questo caso la norma, erroneamente intesa come un principio neutrale e universalmente applicabile, come la razionalità economica, non è in grado di considerare la particolarità delle forme di vita come beni in sé. Difendo l'idea che un'educazione al pensiero critico deve basarsi sulla razionalità genuina e funzionale che caratterizza gli esseri umani in un mondo sociale. (shrink)

Che cosa sono il pensiero critico e l’ingiustizia epistemica? E cosa hanno a che vedere con l’educazione e la riduzione delle disuguaglianze? Secondo una concezione molto diffusa il pensiero critico è un pensiero ragionevole finalizzato a decidere cosa credere e come agire. Tuttavia, come intendere questa ragionevolezza? Affrontare questa questione, nell’ottica del nostro convegno, richiede la considerazione di un altro aspetto noto come ‘ingiustizia epistemica’. L’ingiustizia epistemica è un fenomeno che genera oppressione relativamente a questioni legate alla conoscenza. Ciò accade (...) quando non si ascolta una persona e non si presta attenzione al suo pensiero o al suo giudizio, poiché ritenuti irrilevanti o ingiustamente non competenti, a causa di un pregiudizio. Questi pregiudizi possono essere l’appartenenza del parlante a una diversa classe sociale, a una determinata etnia, o genere o gruppo sociale. Tuttavia, esistono varie forme di ingiustizia epistemica. La conoscenza, infatti, comporta l’interscambio e la partecipazione al dialogo, alla discussione ai gruppi di ricerca. La partecipazione ad un dibattito non richiede solo uno scambio di informazioni, bensì anche la presentazione di domande e la considerazione di possibilità alternative. In questo caso l’ingiustizia epistemica avviene perché la partecipazione di un parlante, sebbene accreditato come competente, non viene presa in considerazione come un valido contributo al dibattito. L’idea di fondo di questo convegno è dunque che la filosofia per ragazzi, attraverso la discussione, nonché la trasmissione di contenuti e problematiche può contribuire all’abbattimento delle barriere che generano le disuguaglianze, favorendo lo sviluppo di una sensibilità critica e al tempo stesso etica. La sensibilità critica risulta funzionale a una forma di resistenza, vale a dire a un uso delle nostre risorse epistemiche e abilità che depotenziano e cambiano le strutture normative oppressive, quale tratto caratteristico della democrazia. Ciò significa concepire la democrazia come un processo dinamico di auto-correzione e apprendimento continui. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the challenges of implementing reflective thinking in engineering ethics education (EEE). It examines existing methods for teaching ethical reflection in EEE and argues that pedagogical activities aiming to foster ethical reflection need to be infused with dialogical interactions and, at a deeper level, informed by dialogism. Dialogism is understood as a relational approach to inquiry in which interactions between moral agents enable them to develop their own understandings through the process of finding shared meanings with the others (...) in activities such as sharing reasons and deliberation. Drawing on pragmatism and phenomenology, the authors conceptualize reflection as a mode of thinking that enables us to monitor and question our assumptions and values – and to synthesize experiences and situations continuously and iteratively. Classroom reflection is a nuanced practice that can be captured through experiential, first-person accounts. Given the centrality of the dialogical experiences in reflection, the assessment methods should focus on evaluating the process rather than the learning outcomes, by emphasizing self-awareness, transformation, and spontaneity in class interactions. In creating opportunities for reflection, instructors need to purposefully consider their choice of specific cases and scenarios used in instruction. Students should be guided to recognize and engage in ethical situations by considering their full, diverse, and complex contextual reality, their own assumptions, values, and experiences, and by promoting dialogical practices in the classroom. (shrink)

“That’s subjective!” People sometimes respond like this to claims about what’s true, what’s ethical, what others find beautiful or aesthetically pleasing, and more. -/- To call a claim “subjective” seems in part to say that something important about the claim depends on the subject—the person—making the claim. What this “something” is varies depending on the claim. -/- Are judgments like these truly “subjective”? What does “subjective” really mean? -/- This essay introduces different answers to these questions.

How might scholarly communities delimit harmonious interpersonal relations for the sake of truth-seeking, yet still aim to realize, within such constraints, the good of harmonious interpersonal relations? To address this question, I consider the resources offered by Japanese neo-Confucian philosopher Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714 CE) in his Taigiroku (Record of Great Doubts). In section I, I sketch the grounds on which Ekken identifies harmonious interpersonal relations with one’s teachers and colleagues as a good worth cultivating and sustaining. Against this background, I (...) explore the grounds on which Ekken nevertheless affirms the goodness of strong critical disagreement within scholarly communities. Thus, I consider his case for delimiting potentially greater interpersonal harmony to allow for certain kinds of adversariality. In section II, I sketch the grounds on which Ekken rejects a strong adversarialism (i.e., the thesis that interpersonal harmony in scholarly communities should be regulated by the good of acquiring and communicating certain kinds of truth, and that inquirers need not attempt to secure interpersonal harmony as far as possible). In section III, I examine how Ekken, while delimiting such interpersonal harmony for the sake of acquiring and communicating certain kinds of truth, nevertheless affirms the goodness of such harmony and incorporates it in his prescriptions. Thus, I sketch the basis on which Ekken endorses a moderate adversarialism (i.e., the thesis that harmonious interpersonal relations in scholarly communities should be regulated by the good of seeking and communicating the relevant truth, and that inquirers should still attempt, as far as possible, to secure interpersonal harmony). In section IV, I address worries that Ekken’s moderate adversarialism faces, and I conclude with final observations. (shrink)

The Really Big Down-Side of an Ultra-Connected Reality (Magical Thinking in General).

What distinguishes the philosophies of education advanced by pragmatists? Does pragmatism have something distinctive to offer contemporary philosophy of education? This paper applies these questions, which Randall Curren asks in “Pragmatist Philosophy of Education” (2009), to a more specific current debate in philosophy of education: the debate over educating for critical thinking, and/or for intellectual virtues. Which, if either, should be given priority in higher education, and why? This paper develops a Deweyan approach to these questions, inviting character content but (...) also offering specific ways for educators and institutions to stay alert to the pedagogical and indoctrination concerns with character education initiatives, including those for intellectual virtues specifically. (shrink)

Abstract‘You are overthinking that!’ The article argues against the popular idea that too much of the activity of thinking is bad for individuals. Wrong thinking, I argue, is what is bad or unhealthy, irrespective of the length of time it is done for. Wrong thinking can lead to worrying, stress, and impedes practical action. But if thinking is done right, then you can't have too much of it.

Contemporary socioecological crises call for educational approaches that move beyond the transmission of environmental knowledge toward the cultivation of critical judgment and responsible citizenship. This article argues that Philosophy for Children (P4C) offers a valuable framework for enriching environmental education by fostering the epistemic dispositions required to navigate complex ecological challenges. Drawing on virtue epistemology, particularly the work of Linda Zagzebski and Quassim Cassam, the article introduces the concept of epistemic training as a pedagogical process aimed at cultivating intellectual virtues (...) such as humility, curiosity, intellectual flexibility, and epistemic courage while countering epistemic vices including dogmatism, arrogance, oversimplification, and epistemic negligence. Through a theoretical analysis of philosophical dialogue and communities of inquiry, the article examines how collaborative inquiry, deliberation, and multidimensional thinking can strengthen students’ capacity to evaluate information critically, deliberate ethically, and respond thoughtfully to environmental issues. Building on the educational philosophies of John Dewey, Matthew Lipman, Margaret Sharp, and Michel Tozzi, it argues that philosophical dialogue can contribute to the development of ecological citizenship by integrating critical reflection, ethical responsibility, and democratic participation. Ultimately, the article proposes epistemic training as a promising avenue for rethinking philosophy education in support of environmental education and the formation of reflective, intellectually virtuous citizens capable of addressing the complexities of the socioecological crisis. (shrink)