Abstract

Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to preserve freedom is the mark of subjectivist/emotivist theories of ethics. Rejecting freedom to emphasize rationality belongs to the naturalist/descriptivist theories. This book aims to reconcile these positions and do away with the alleged antinomy. The argument makes three main assumptions: (1) moral judgements are prescriptive; (2) they are universalizable; (3) there are genuine logical relations between prescriptive judgements. Insofar as moral judgements are universalizable, rationality gets a foothold, and their prescriptivity is intimately related to freedom to form one's own moral judgements. The first part of the book elaborates the thesis of universalizability and the connection between this feature and the fact that moral judgements have a descriptive element in addition to being prescriptive. The second and third parts expound the beginnings of a theory of moral reasoning grounded in the logic of prescriptivity and universalizability. It is argued that moral judgements are universalizable and prescriptive, and have an element of descriptive meaning. Moral judgements seriously intended must be taken as committing the speaker to some universal judgement applying to anyone in relevantly similar situations (universalizability). The thesis maintained here (universal prescriptivism) retains what is sound in descriptivism (natural and non‐natural), improving upon it by revealing the additional, prescriptive element of moral judgement. It is argued that the connection between universalizability and descriptive meaning is logically tight: it is impossible to maintain with consistency that moral judgements are descriptive yet not universalizable (descriptivism entails universalizability). However, descriptivism is not a complete account of evaluative language, and prescriptivism is additionally required to reach the mark. The ethical theory presented in this book is prescriptivist: it is argued that it is an essential characteristic of moral terms that judgements containing them are, as typically used, intended as guides for conduct. The view shares with naturalism the emphasis on the possession of non‐moral properties by the object of moral judgement, which qualifies it for evaluation of its kind. However, it differs from the naturalist view of moral discourse in rejecting its understanding of moral argument. The prescriptivist thrust of the argument is brought to bear upon the question of the freedom of will. The book defends Hume's doctrine that one cannot deduce moral judgements from non‐moral statements of fact, and the application of this theory, which says that one cannot deduce morally substantial conclusions from non‐moral statements about the use of the moral terms. The explorations of various chapters produce theses about moral reasoning that are logical, not substantial: the robustly moral is derived from the particular predicament of the moral arguers. This comes out clearly in the discussion of universalizability and utilitarianism. The Humean thesis does not as supposed lead to the conclusion that the only kind of cogent moral argument is one which is premised on moral assumptions shared between the parties to the argument; on the contrary, it is maintained that once the logical character of the moral concepts is understood, there can be useful and compelling moral arguments between people who do not share a substantive moral outlook. The discussion brings together issues of moral conflict, interests, and ideals and the ability of the theory to handle conflict in practical scenarios.