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Description
Kernel LPE vulnerabilities (Copy Fail, DirtyFrag and Fragnesia) - AKS remediation guidance
Update: September 9, 2026
Fixed AKS node images are available for the Ubuntu and Azure Linux kernel families listed below. Upgrade existing node pools to a current supported image at or above the applicable minimum; publication of an image does not update existing nodes. This update supersedes earlier statements in this issue that Ubuntu fixes were still pending.
Advisory status: open pending release of the Ubuntu 20.04 FIPS module-mitigation cleanup (Azure/AgentBaker#9431). Its fixed kernel is already available; the remaining work removes obsolete module restrictions, not a missing kernel security patch. The cleanup release vehicle will be added here before closing this advisory.
| Vulnerability | CVE | Affected module |
|---|---|---|
| Copy Fail | CVE-2026-31431 | algif_aead |
| DirtyFrag | CVE-2026-43284, CVE-2026-43500 | esp4, esp6, rxrpc |
| Fragnesia | CVE-2026-46300 | esp4, esp6 |
These Linux kernel flaws can allow a local attacker, including an attacker with execution in a container under affected configurations, to escalate privileges. Windows nodes are outside the scope of these Linux kernel vulnerabilities.
Minimum fixed node images
The minimum applies within the same OS and kernel family, not across different image SKUs. Use the newest supported image available in your region rather than pinning to these historical minimums.
| AKS image / kernel family | Minimum fixed VHD | Kernel package in that VHD |
|---|---|---|
| Ubuntu 22.04, standard Azure kernel; Gen1, Gen2, Trusted Launch and ARM64 | 202606.08.1 |
5.15.0-1114.123 |
| Ubuntu 22.04 FIPS; Gen1, Gen2 and FIPS Trusted Launch | 202606.08.1 |
5.15.0-1114.123+fips1 |
Ubuntu 24.04, standard Azure kernel; Gen1, Gen2, Trusted Launch and ARM64 when booted with the standard -azure kernel |
202606.08.1 |
6.8.0-1059.65 |
| Ubuntu 20.04 FIPS; Gen1 and Gen2 | 202606.08.1 |
5.4.0-1164.170+fips1 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 confidential VM, Azure FDE kernel | 202606.08.1 |
6.8.0-1058.65 |
| Azure Linux 3.0, standard host kernel; Gen1, Gen2, ARM64, FIPS, Trusted Launch and CVM variants | 202605.27.0 |
6.6.139.1-1.azl3 |
Ubuntu 20.04's 5.4 kernel is not affected by Fragnesia; the listed FIPS image contains the fixes needed for the other CVEs. Its inclusion documents the historical remediation floor and does not extend OS support.
Sources: Ubuntu 22.04 image packages, 24.04 image packages, 22.04 FIPS packages, 20.04 FIPS packages, 24.04 CVM packages, and Azure Linux 3.0 image packages.
The Ubuntu images were published in the AKS June 19 release. The standard/FIPS kernel fixes are recorded on Canonical's CVE pages linked above. For Ubuntu 24.04 FDE, the matching Canonical package changelog records Copy Fail and both DirtyFrag/Fragnesia fixes; this is separate evidence from the standard Azure kernel's version number. Azure Linux 3.0 remediation and module-policy changes are tracked in Azure/AgentBaker#8546.
Module mitigation removal: a separate release milestone
| Configuration | Status of AgentBaker's temporary module restrictions |
|---|---|
| Ubuntu 22.04 / 24.04, covered kernel families | Kernel-aware cleanup already shipped in AgentBaker v0.20260729.1, targeting VHD 202607.29.0. The VHD patch suffix is .0, not .1. |
| Ubuntu 20.04 FIPS | Kernel-fixed since 202606.08.1, but released scripts still retain the restrictions. Cleanup is proposed in Azure/AgentBaker#9431 for running 5.4.0-*-azure-fips kernels at ABI 1164 or newer; the PR is not yet merged and no released cleanup VHD is claimed. |
| Azure Linux 3.0, standard host kernel | The four-module restriction was omitted from new builds starting with 202605.27.0. Existing restrictions are not actively removed by the Azure Linux runtime CSE path. |
Ubuntu cleanup is implemented by Azure/AgentBaker#8997 and Azure/AgentBaker#9054, both included in the published AgentBaker release. VHD 202607.29.0 is listed in the AKS August 7 release.
For the verified Ubuntu 22.04 Azure/FIPS family, released cleanup uses running-kernel ABI 1116 or newer, more conservative than the vendor's first fixed ABI 1114. For the verified Ubuntu 24.04 standard Azure/FDE family it uses ABI 1058 or newer. The July image meets these cutoffs. June's fixed-kernel floor must not be presented as the first image with mitigation removed.
Cleanup is run during provisioning, including the real-node phase used after PIS preprovisioning; it is not a background update to existing nodes. Scriptless provisioning uses the scripts baked into the image. Older script-based CSE can reapply restrictions even with a newer image, so consuming the corresponding provisioning implementation matters as well as the kernel and image.
Important exclusions
Do not remove mitigation merely because an image version is newer than the table. The following are not covered by its fixed-kernel assurance:
- Ubuntu ARM64 using an Azure NVIDIA kernel. Images can contain both standard Azure and NVIDIA kernels. In particular,
6.14.0-1007-azure-nvidiais not covered by the standard Ubuntu 24.04 fix. Check the kernel actually running. - Ubuntu 20.04 confidential VM / other unlisted FDE kernel families. Do not reuse the standard/FIPS or Ubuntu 24.04 FDE thresholds for another kernel family.
- Azure Linux OSGuard (
kernel-ipe). Retain its existing module restrictions; the standard Azure Linux kernel threshold does not apply to it. - Kata guest kernels (
kernel-uvm/kernel-mshv). The Azure Linux row covers the node host kernel, including hosts running Kata, not the separate guest kernel. Do not infer a guest-kernel fix from the host image version. - Azure Linux 2.0 / Mariner and other unlisted or unsupported streams. No fixed-image minimum is asserted here. Keep applicable protection in place and migrate unsupported pools to a supported OS.
For an excluded configuration that requires the affected modules, contact Azure Support for configuration-specific guidance rather than bypassing the restrictions.
Update existing node pools
Check the pool's current image and the newest image offered in its region:
az aks nodepool show \
--resource-group <resource-group> \
--cluster-name <cluster-name> \
--name <node-pool-name> \
--query nodeImageVersion -o tsv
az aks nodepool get-upgrades \
--resource-group <resource-group> \
--cluster-name <cluster-name> \
--nodepool-name <node-pool-name> \
--query latestNodeImageVersion -o tsvPerform a node-image-only upgrade for each affected pool, using your normal maintenance, surge and disruption-budget process:
az aks nodepool upgrade \
--resource-group <resource-group> \
--cluster-name <cluster-name> \
--name <node-pool-name> \
--node-image-onlyAfter the rollout, inspect every node, not just pool metadata:
kubectl get nodes -o custom-columns='NAME:.metadata.name,IMAGE:.metadata.labels.kubernetes\.azure\.com/node-image-version,KERNEL:.status.nodeInfo.kernelVersion'Confirm the image meets its applicable minimum and the running kernel belongs to the covered family. Installing a package without booting the fixed kernel is insufficient. See AKS node-image upgrades and the AKS release tracker for upgrade and regional availability guidance.
Retiring temporary module mitigation
Kernel remediation and removal of historical module restrictions are separate. A patched kernel can remain protected from exploitation even while a legacy blacklist still blocks legitimate module use.
Only retire the advisory's temporary mitigation after all nodes it protects are on confirmed fixed kernels, including any pools it targets through automation. Older/unverified configurations must keep the applicable protection.
If you deployed the self-service kernel-lpe-mitigate or legacy cve-2026-31431-mitigate DaemonSet, first update its deployment source so it will not be recreated, then remove that specific deployment once the covered nodes are fixed. Deleting the DaemonSet does not delete the host configuration it already wrote. The advisory's combined DaemonSet used /etc/modprobe.d/disable-kernel-lpe.conf.
Prefer node replacement with an image/provisioning combination that no longer applies the temporary rules. If restrictions persist on confirmed fixed nodes, identify the owner of each configuration file before changing it. Do not delete entire CIS configuration files, clear all modprobe rules, or remove Canonical/package-managed policy. Do not apply host-rule cleanup to excluded pools.
For nodes still relying on mitigation, blocking future module loads does not neutralize a vulnerable module that is already loaded. Follow the applicable mitigation procedure, including safe unloading or reboot/node replacement. Conversely, absence of a blacklist on a fixed kernel does not indicate vulnerability.
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Activity
LucaIcaro commentedon May 1, 2026
I have not run the workaround yet, but I wanted to post this result from one of our AKS clusters:
djsly commentedon May 1, 2026
Thank you for reporting this Luca Bevilacqua (@LucaIcaro). This confirms the vulnerability is exploitable on current AKS nodes. I have updated the description with the more up to date reality.
Why this works
While
algif_aeadis not loaded by default on AKS nodes, the Linux kernel's module auto-loading mechanism (request_module) will automatically load it when any process — even an unprivileged one — creates an AF_ALG socket with AEAD type. This is exactly what the exploit does.In your case:
algif_aead→ exploits the vulnerability → gains root on the node ❌What to do now
Apply the mitigation DaemonSet from the advisory above. It blocks the module from being auto-loaded by creating a modprobe rule (
install algif_aead /bin/false). Once blocked, the kernel cannot auto-load the module, and the exploit will fail.The AKS team is actively rolling out hotfix VHDs that include this mitigation baked in. New nodes created from patched VHDs will be protected automatically.
LucaIcaro commentedon May 1, 2026
Sylvain Boily (@djsly) confirmed that the workaround works
djsly commentedon May 1, 2026
🚀 Hotfix Globally Deployed — May 1, 2026
Both hotfixed AgentBaker service versions are now globally deployed:
v20260413v20260424What this means for you
az aks nodepool upgrade --node-image-only) will automatically pick up the CVE-2026-31431 mitigation.Action required for existing nodes
Nodes that were created before this deployment are still unprotected. To protect them, you can either:
az aks nodepool upgrade -g <rg> -n <nodepool> --cluster-name <cluster> --node-image-onlyrovangju commentedon May 1, 2026
Would it make sense to suggest a higher PriorityClass on the DaemonSet example?
And is the
hostNetwork: truenecessary?djsly commentedon May 1, 2026
Great suggestions Justin Rovang (@rovangju) — both valid. Updated the DaemonSet definitions:
Added
priorityClassName: system-node-critical— ensures the mitigation pods get scheduled even under node resource pressure. This is a node-level security fix so it warrants critical priority.Removed
hostNetwork: true— you're right, it's not needed. The DaemonSet only writes modprobe config to the host filesystem and runsrmmod/modprobeviachroot. No network operations involved.Added resource requests/limits — minimal footprint (
10mCPU,16Mi/32Mimemory) since the pod just runs a one-shot script thensleep infinity.Both the mitigation and rollback DaemonSets in the advisory above have been updated. Thanks for the review! 👍
TripleEmcoder commentedon May 2, 2026
What's the status on the Container App front? Is there a separate tracking issue somewhere?
ops(aks): patch CVE-2026-31431 via node image upgrade (#39)
j-chao commentedon May 3, 2026
should the mitigation verification command when using
kubectl debugbe:(checking under /host/etc instead of /etc).
instead?
huf1 commentedon May 3, 2026
can confirm, that running it with /etc (without /host) it still prints "⚠️ VULNERABLE: No mitigation found"
34 remaining items
obriegr0909 commentedon May 12, 2026
Is anyone else getting false positive alerts from Defender for Containers when deploying the DaemonSet? Seems the Defender runtime sensor is detecting some keywords in the DaemonSet yaml manifest itself?
huf1 commentedon May 12, 2026
yes, same in our azure defender
Exvitermin commentedon May 12, 2026
Same here.
djsly commentedon May 13, 2026
I have been told by the MSDefender team that this false positive was resolved yesterday.
christian-heusel commentedon May 13, 2026
Sylvain Boily (@djsly) will this advisory also be updated for fragnesia / "copyfail 3.0" (CVE-2026-46300) or should I file a separate issue to track it?
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/13/5
kkrypt0nn commentedon May 13, 2026
It very much doesn't need a new issue, at most a "PS" that the CVE is already covered by the mitigations in place.
kzzalews commentedon May 13, 2026
Fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) — empirical confirmation on Ubuntu 22.04 / kernel 5.15 · Kyverno Level-3 PSS does not mitigate
Following @christian-heusel's question above — tested today on an AKS node running
5.15.0-1110-azure.Methodology
runAsUser: 65534(nobody) ·allowPrivilegeEscalation: false·capabilities: drop: [ALL]— Kyverno Level-3 PSE-compliant, no privileged flaggcc fragnesia.c -o expinside the pod as UID 65534./expas nobodyResult
Conclusions
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false(no_new_privs=1) does not block this exploit.unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET)is unaffected byno_new_privs; pod security policies at the Kubernetes layer offer no protection here.unprivileged_userns_clone=1and noapparmor_restrict_unprivileged_usernssysctl (does not exist on 5.15) — preconditions identical to the DirtyFrag xfrm-ESP path.esp4/esp6modules), same blacklist, same DaemonSet from this advisory. No additional action needed beyond what was already recommended.The test script has been updated to include Step 4 — Fragnesia: dirtyfrag-cve-test.sh — now covers CVE-2026-43284, CVE-2026-43500, CVE-2026-31431, CVE-2026-46300.
Written by: Aiko (Claude Sonnet 4.6) · Lv. 16.7 · 2026-05-13 · on behalf of Karol Zalewski
Human review: Test executed and output observed directly by Karol Zalewski (Platform/DevOps Engineer). Analysis and write-up reviewed and approved by Karol before posting.
Context: Source: v12-security/pocs/fragnesia · #5753
Note: The exploit was executed inside a Kubernetes pod, not directly on the host. Root shell confirms kernel-level privilege escalation via the xfrm ESP-in-TCP code path. No container escape was attempted or tested.
[-]Kernel LPE Vulnerabilities (Copy Fail + DirtyFrag) — AKS Advisory & Mitigation Guide[/-][+]Kernel LPE Vulnerabilities (Copy Fail + DirtyFrag + Fragnesia) — AKS Advisory & Mitigation Guide[/+].github/workflows: run AKS IPsec conformance on AzureLinux nodes
.github/workflows: run AKS IPsec conformance on AzureLinux nodes
.github/workflows: run AKS IPsec conformance on AzureLinux nodes
.github/workflows: run AKS IPsec conformance on AzureLinux nodes
[-]Kernel LPE Vulnerabilities (Copy Fail + DirtyFrag + Fragnesia) — AKS Advisory & Mitigation Guide[/-][+]Kernel LPE vulnerabilities (Copy Fail, DirtyFrag and Fragnesia) - AKS remediation guidance[/+]djsly commentedon Sep 9, 2026
The advisory has been updated with verified fixed-kernel image minimums, upgrade instructions and separate mitigation-cleanup status. This replaces the earlier statements that Ubuntu fixes were still pending.
For the explicitly covered kernel families, the Ubuntu kernel-fix floor is 202606.08.1; Ubuntu 22.04/24.04 cleanup shipped with VHD 202607.29.0. The standard Azure Linux 3.0 host-kernel floor is 202605.27.0. These minimums do not extend to excluded kernel families, and existing nodes must consume the applicable image upgrade.
Ubuntu 20.04 FIPS already has fixed kernels, but its obsolete module restrictions are addressed separately in Azure/AgentBaker#9431. That PR is not yet merged or released. This advisory remains open until the cleanup ships and its release vehicle is recorded here.
.github/workflows: run AKS IPsec conformance on AzureLinux nodes